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Huntington’s White Patriotism and
Anzaldúa’s Brown Nationalism
Charles R. Venator Santiago*
In recent years, several faculty members of the John F. Kennedy
School of Government at Harvard University have been publishing texts
that contribute to a politics of “backlash.” These backlash narratives have
been central to the framing of a conservative ideological discourse that has
been seeking to overturn the progressive legacies of the New Deal and the
civil rights movement. Harvey C. Mansfield has written a book on the mi1
sogynous virtues of manliness; Robert Putman has written on the chal2
lenges of diversity to civic engagement and social capital and, more recently, has published a prize winning essay offering empirical evidence that
3
challenges liberal notions of diversity; and Samuel P. Huntington has published a book espousing the virtues of white Anglo-Saxon protestant
4
(WASP) patriotic identity. These political scientists have been contributing
5
to the promotion of a conservative ideological tradition that is often pre-

*
Prepared for presentation as a Work-in-Progress in the XII Annual LatCrit Meeting, Miami,
Florida, October 2007. This is part of a larger project exploring the contributions to “backlash” politics
by Harvard University John F. Kennedy’s School of Government professors. I am indebted to the comments, challenges, and criticisms of the assigned readers, Tanya K. Hernandez and George Martinez, as
well 1as to the other members of the session.
HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, MANLINESS (2006). For a response, see generally Gary Wills, Mousiness, 53 THE N. Y. REV. OF BOOKS , June 6, 2006, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/19052
(last visited Sept. 11, 2007).
2
ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN
COMMUNITY (2000). For a response, see generally Vicente Navarro, A Critique of Social Capital, 32
INT’L J. OF HEALTH SERVICES 423 (2002); and Rodney E. Hero, Social Capital and Racial Inequality in
America, 1 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS, March 2003, at 113.
3
Robert D. Putnam, E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century,
The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture, 30 SCANDINAVIAN POLITICAL STUDIES 137 (2007), available at
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9477.2007.00176.x (last visited Sept. 11,
2007).
4
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE? THE CHALLENGES TO AMERICA’S NATIONAL
IDENTITY (2004).
5
For a substantive discussion of competing visions of the notion of ideology, see generally
DOGMAS AND DREAMS: A READER IN MODERN POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES (Nancy S. Love ed., 3d ed.
1998).
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mised on insinuations, vague suggestions, and truth claims that rely more
on the blind connection of conceptual “dots” than a clear structural analysis
that explores the relationship between individuals and structural realities.
Suffice it to say that this academic “backlash” has been instrumental in sustaining an otherwise intellectually bankrupt and discredited ideological tradition.
In this article, I would like to begin to focus on one particular aspect of
Samuel P. Huntington’s recent defense of a white Anglo-Saxon protestant
patriotic narrative that seeks to reclaim a central discursive space in the
United States. Huntington’s book, Who Are We?, seeks to resuscitate a series of intellectually bankrupt, racialist, and racist nationalist ideologies in
order to re-establish the predominance of a white Anglo-Saxon protestant
and patriotic discourse against the actual, potential, and imagined challenges posed by the presence of Latino/a (although primarily Mexican) immigrants. His overall argument relies on conceptual antilogies, insinuations, and incomplete and selective data as well as an ideological selection
of de-contextualized historical events. Ironically, despite the poverty of
Huntington’s defense of a WASP patriotic ideology, his nationalist arguments echo similar arguments offered by Latino/a cultural nationalists like
Gloria Anzaldúa. Despite the difference in the political implications of
Huntington’s and Anzaldúa’s narratives, at a conceptual level their arguments are quite similar. In my opinion, this conceptual similarity poses a
6
problem for scholars that rely on Anzaldúa’s borderland myth to substantiate alternative narratives of resistance.
At present, this paper is divided in three parts that address the two dimensions of my argument. Part I begins with a discussion of the conceptual
limitations of Huntington’s text by providing examples of the ideological
character of the argument; the selection of events to narrate an incomplete
history; a brief discussion of the nature of the data; and some suggestions
concerning the place of structural inequalities in the object of discussion.
Part II shifts the discussion to a comparison of both Huntington and Anzaldúa’s nationalist ideologies. Part III offers some comments on the application of LatCrit approaches to the premises of these nationalist ideologies.
At present, the conclusion suggests two conceptual critiques that are premised on a leftist critique.
I. THE LIMITS OF HUNTINGTON’S WHITE LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
In the foreword to his book, Huntington provides the reader with the
following caveat or warning:
6

GLORIA ANZALDÚA, BORDERLANDS/LA FRONTERA, THE NEW MESTIZA (2d ed.1999).
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This book is shaped by my own identities as a patriot and a scholar. . .
. The motives of patriotism and scholarship, however, may conflict.
Recognizing this problem, I attempt to engage in as detached and thorough an analysis as I can, while warning the reader that my selection
and presentation of that evidence may well be influenced by my patriotic desire to find meaning and virtue in America’s past and in its
7
possible future.
Huntington’s narrative proves to be more patriotic than scholarly. In
fact, his “desire” to find “virtue” in America’s past and in its possible future
perhaps led him to create a narrative that could only be told through insinuations, conjectures, and incomplete claims that are often more stated than
demonstrated. This narrative conveniently and disingenuously neglects to
describe how the virtues of Huntington’s America created the oppressive
conditions that provide the context for his challenges. The patriotic desire
to exalt the virtues of a white nationalist creed provides the context for
Huntington’s historical narrative. The reader who approaches his book with
a WASP patriotic predisposition to make sense of his undeveloped statements can bring coherence to these arguments in a conservative ideological
realm where only partial truths and faith can hold the narrative together.
This ideological method, a method that is willing to displace truth in
favor of a WASP patriotic approach to scholarship, provides the context for
Huntington’s text. To this extent, any significant discussion of Huntington’s argument is bound to require a critical position that is willing to sustain ideological charges of being un-patriotic, treasonous, and un-American.
Notwithstanding this effort to close-off scholarly debate and critique, I want
to suggest that an immanent reading of Who Are We? inevitably leads to a
dead end on its own terms. To be sure, in this part of the article I want to
suggest four examples of the conceptual limitations of Huntington’s argument. I begin with a discussion of Huntington’s defense of a notion of Anglo-American liberal democracy that is more Anglo-American than liberal
or democratic. This is followed by a discussion of egalitarian legal claims
that are premised on everything but equality. A third focus of my argument
questions the selective use of data to paint a comprehensive picture of Latino/as in the United States. I conclude this part with a discussion of the
ideological implications of notions of self-responsibility within a capitalist
social order. In sum, I argue that Huntington’s book is premised on conceptual contradictions that can only be defended by ideological claims and
insinuations, not by scholarly argument.

7

HUNTINGTON, supra note 4, at xvi-xvii.

FIU Law Review

36

[4:33

Throughout his book, Huntington repeatedly asserts that his critique
aims to defend American liberal, democratic principles that have been established by a WASP founding culture. Yet he simultaneously criticizes
liberals for believing that:
[A] nation can be based on only a political contract among individuals
lacking any other commonality. This is the classic Enlightenment
based, civic conception of a nation. History and psychology, however,
suggest that it is unlikely to be enough to sustain a nation for long.
America with only the Creed as a basis for unity could soon evolve into a loosed confederation of ethnic, racial, cultural, and political
groups, with little or nothing in common apart from their location in
8
the territory of what had been the United States of America. (Emphasis added.)
In other words, Huntington dismisses the liberal notion of recognition
that is premised on the idea that the individual can be a law-abiding, and
9
even patriotic, public citizen, while simultaneously embracing private so10
cial and/or moral views of the world. Ironically, it is precisely the historical malleability of public/institutional forms of citizenship that has been
responsible for domesticating dissent in the United States and integrating
different populations despite their private views of the world. Marketoriented law and policy and, later, capitalism have also been constant companions of the Anglo-American liberal ethos. Stated differently, the insidious genius of the American liberal project has been its ability to displace
public dissent to the private realm and to shift the terms of debate from the
public-political realm to the private arena. Hence, so long as the public
realm can be sanitized and the terms of debate domesticated, the AngloAmerican liberal polity can claim a sanitized notion of public equality or
democracy.
However, Huntington’s critique of liberalism is premised on the notion
that in order for liberal democracy to maintain its stability in the United
States, the private, cultural values of citizens should be consistent with the
public ethos of the nation. In order to achieve this harmony, Latino migrants and immigrants should assimilate the WASP culture, which was presumably the “founding” culture of this nation’s public institutions. In other
words, the Latino immigrant is expected not only to assimilate public citi-

8

Id. at 19.
Kwame Anthony Appiah, Cosmopolitan Patriots, in COSMOPOLITICS, THINKING AND FEELING
BEYOND THE NATION 91 (Pheng Cheah & Bruce Robbins eds., 1998).
10 Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM AND THE “POLITICS OF
RECOGNITION” 37 (Amy Gutman ed., 1992).
9
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zenship values, but also the private cultural ethos of a mythic and essentialized original culture. This hegemonic view of a WASP culture, of course,
neglects to address the abuses and injustices that were both inherent in, and
11
historically tied to it. It follows that Huntington’s notion of liberal democracy requires an assimilated subject that is not negotiating a conflict between his or her public and private positions. Whereas the traditional conservative approach would probably seek to eliminate the private-public
divide, Huntington’s narrative simply demands that immigrants abandon
their private cultural identity by assimilating the hegemonic WASP culture.
It follows that egalitarian notions of democracy are to be realized among
subjects who share the same public and private cultural values.
In order to substantiate this argument, Huntington cherry-picks historical events and data that fit his patriotic narrative. These events and data are
further represented in a manner that minimizes or in some cases eliminates
controversies or inconsistencies. One example of this discursive strategy
can be discerned from his engagement with the law. To be sure, describing
the period following World War II and beginning in the 1960s, Huntington
writes that:
Americans were one nation of individuals with equal rights, who
shared a primarily Anglo-Protestant core culture, and were dedicated
to the liberal-democratic principles of the American Creed. This, at
least, was the prevailing image Americans had of what their country
should be, and the goal toward which, in some measure, it seemed to
be moving. In the 1960s powerful movements began to challenge the
salience, the substance, and the desirability of this concept of
12
America.
The “powerful movements” that Huntington refers to were among others the civil rights movement comprised primarily, but not exclusively, of
black citizens of the United States who had been denied full equality under
the law and had been segregated under a harsh system of inegalitarian apartheid. It follows that civil rights challenges to the apartheid legal system
created by Anglo-Protestant core values should be read as a destabilizing
force that threatened America by creating the conditions that enabled the redefinition of the American public realm. Huntington’s America is a place
where dissent and challenges to abusive structures of subordination, oppression, and exploitation should be conceptualized as destabilizing and dangerous.
11 Luis R. Fraga & Gary M. Segura, Culture Clash? Contesting Notions of American Identity and
the Effects of Latin American Immigration, 4 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS at 279, 283 (2006).
12 HUNTINGTON, supra note 4, at 141.
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Regarding the rule of law, Huntington suggests, without providing
substantive examples, that:
Americans, it is often said, are a people defined by and united by their
commitment to the political principles of liberty, equality, democracy,
individualism, human rights, the rule of law, and private property embodied in the American Creed. . . . The creedal definition allows
Americans to hold that theirs is an “exceptional” country because unlike other nations its identity is defined by principle rather than ascription and, at the same time, to claim that America is a “universal” na13
tion because its principles are applicable to all human societies.
I will assume that I need not discuss how the failures of the United
States occupation of Iraq; the torture chambers in Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo Bay; the inconsistent trials of United States occupation soldiers
committing murder, rape, and massacres; and the consistent lack of commitment to human rights conventions have contributed to discredit this patriotic statement. However, what I do want to note is that Huntington suggests the possibility of a notion of human rights that is irreconcilable with
his own depiction of a white Anglo-Saxon protestant nationalism unless we
equate this identity with a universal conception of humanity. Needless to
say, unless humanity is meant to be modeled after a WASP national identity,
one has to wonder what Huntington is talking about.
Huntington’s allusion to notions of the rule of law is important because
it can help us understand some of the ways that patriotic readings of United
States legal history can obscure grave, structural injustices that form the
basis for the very identity that Huntington expects Latino/as to embrace or
assimilate. Stated differently, Huntington expects Latin America and Latino/as to embrace a WASP national identity that has been historically and
consistently responsible for a series of abuses committed against Latin
American immigrants and Latino/as residing in the United States. The case
of the annexation of the Mexican territories provides us with a useful example of the myopic nature of Huntington’s mythical history. Huntington
readily acknowledges that the United States usurped and conquered parts of
14
the Mexican nation during the war of 1846-48. What he does not ac15
knowledge is the process entailed in occupying the Mexican territories.
The United States violated the Treaty of Adams-De Onís (1819) by enabling the settlement of Texas and, in turn, violated virtually all the tenets of
13

Id. at 46-48.
Id. at 45.
15 I refer to the Mexican territories as a conceptual example. In my opinion, the Mexican government was acting as an imperialist and authoritarian force against indigenous populations.
14
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the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (1848) when it allowed the states to pass
racist citizenship laws that denied Mexican property owners the right to
16
exercise their property rights. The United States government also violated
its own agreement by declaring the Treaty invalid in 1898 and by denying
Mexican citizens the right to land guaranteed under the terms of the Trea17
ty. The point to be made is that Huntington’s legal history avoids a discussion and recollection of important structural injustices that have contributed to creating the conditions that fuel a counter-United States narrative.
To be sure, it is ridiculous to expect Mexicans and subjects of Mexican heritage to embrace a United States history that has been responsible for the
creation of structural inequalities that lead to poverty, subordination, and
outright exploitation.
Huntington disingenuously uses selective “data” to substantiate his
ideological narrative and suggests that Mexican immigrants, and Latinos/as,
more generally, are less likely to “assimilate” into the WASP national identity. Rather than looking at all of the available data on assimilation and
developing an argument that takes into account actual political and methodological debates, he conveniently chooses to use data that can be reconciled with his project. This approach is especially egregious given the
availability of data that directly challenges Huntington’s claims on assimilation. To be sure, as Fraga et al. have noted in the American Political
Science Review:
Examination of these claims has been facilitated by the development
of a body of large-scale data sets, such as the National Chicano Survey
(1979), the National Latino Immigrant Survey (1988), and the Latino
National Political Survey (1989), by Latino politics researchers. As a
result of research drawing on this data, charges that Latinos’ deficiencies have been shown to be largely, if not entirely, unsubstantiated.
Contrary to other assertions, this research finds that Hispanics are in
fact, well “assimilated,” with most Latinos holding or sharing the
same core values and attitudinal predispositions associated with de18
mocracy as other Americans.
There is plenty of data and research available addressing Huntington’s
anxieties that disprove most of Huntington’s claims regarding Latino assimilation. The question, however, is why did he neglect to engage the data
16 See Richard Griswold del Castillo, Symposium: Manifest Destiny: The Mexican-American War
and the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 5 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 31 (1998).
17 Cessna v. United States, 169 U.S. 165 (1898).
18 Luis R. Fraga, John A. Garcia, Rodney E. Hero, Michael Jones-Correa, Valerie Martinez-Ebers,
& Gary M. Segura, Su Casa Es Nuestra Casa: Latino Politics Research and the Development of American Political Science, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 463, 518 (2006).
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directly? My suspicion is that if Huntington would have engaged this data
and research directly, it is not likely that he would have been able to substantiate the virtues of his patriotic ideology and the Mexican Other would
have disappeared. More importantly, I also contend that the data on assimilation may simply be irrelevant to understanding the relationship of Mexican immigrants or, for that matter, the relationship of Latino/a immigrants
to the United States polity because cultural assimilation may have little to
do with public behavior in a liberal democracy that encourages its subjects
to lead fragmented public and private lives.
In addition, Huntington correlates individual economic success with
assimilation in a capitalist society. His arguments simply neglect to consider how discrimination and exploitation can act as barriers for the financial
upward mobility of Mexican immigrants and Latino/as more generally.
Drawing on a homogenizing and parsimonious narrative of the Mexican
immigrant experience, Huntington identifies at least five examples of the
economic malaises that are presumably representative of the failure of this
immigrant group to assimilate. He argues that the “economic position of
Mexican immigrants parallels, as one would expect, their educational at19
tainment.” Again cherry-picking data for one year (1989-1990), Huntington makes a broad and unsubstantiated suggestion that “Mexican-origin
people” are likely to remain “distant from the American norm” in terms of
20
educational levels. Of course, Huntington also neglects to explain that
obstacles are present for Mexican immigrants regarding access to educa21
tion, and that structural inequalities and market manipulation may in fact
be creating the conditions that hinder access not only to decent education,
but also to the kind of status-oriented educational institutions that will open
22
doors later in life.
Additional arguments include “low” numbers of immigrants in professional and managerial positions, low rates of self-employment and entrepreneurship, higher rates of poverty and welfare dependency, and a pre23
sumed lag in wage-earning levels. It follows that assimilation will be the
pre-condition for the achievement of the American Dream. The problem

19

HUNTINGTON, supra note 4, at 234.
Id. at 237-38.
21 María Pabón López, Reflections on Educating Latino and Latina Undocumented Children:
Beyond Plyler v. Doe, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 1373 (2005).
22 San Antonio Sch. District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (suggesting that poverty and educational attainment are not necessarily indicators for success in a capitalist society).
23 HUNTINGTON, supra note 4, at 234-38. For reliable data on wage earnings among foreign-born
or immigrant Latinos, see RAKESH KOCHHAR, PEW HISPANIC CTR 1995 – 2005: FOREIGN-BORN
LATINOS MAKE PROGRESS ON WAGES (2007), available at http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?
ReportID=78.
20
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with all of these arguments is that they ignore the structural hierarchies inherent in a capitalist system and institutionalized by a state that has reproduced vast structural inequalities. Huntington’s arguments assume that
immigrants and/or Latinos/as are, or can be, at an equal starting point as the
WASP subject. Huntington also neglects to factor in the impact of the lack
of egalitarian legal protections against discrimination towards immigrants
24
particularly in the area of labor rights; the impact of wealth accumulation
in the development of family on various forms of capital; and the real impact of glass ceilings for Latino/as wage earners. To be sure, Huntington’s
economic analysis relies on a “built-in failure to consider structural and
institutional aspects of power in contemporary capitalist liberal democra25
cies.” More importantly, Huntington’s argument is premised on an obvious, conceptual contradiction that, on the one hand, calls for a patriotic,
collective identity of assimilated immigrants and citizens alike and simulta26
neously embraces an atomizing and competitive, capitalist narrative. The
reader is left with an economic critique of individual self-responsibility that
does not account for the obstacles presented to immigrants by structural and
27
institutional inequalities founded on racist and xenophobic ideologies.
Huntington’s patriotic narrative can be read as an effort to construct an
ideological justification to represent the Mexican immigrant, and the Latino/a more generally, as a potential threat. In order to achieve this, Huntington’s narrative has to rely on a selective discussion of debates, history, data,
and socio-economic representations of Latino/as. Rather than engaging the
complexity of issues informing the debates shaping the impact of Mexican
migrants and/or Latino/as more broadly in the United States, Huntington
selectively navigates oceans of information until he finds islands of evidence that can lend credence to his patriotic story. In this sense, Huntington’s text is simply another misleading form of nativist propaganda that
carries the seal of an academic institution. This is just another text that legitimates a status quo that creates the conditions for the subordination, oppression, and exploitation of Latino/a immigrants. This is just one more
text that contributes to the creation of an exploitative environment where it
is justified to treat Latino/as, who do not fit Huntington’s schema, as potential threats to a right-wing status quo.
24 Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002) (addressing the ability of
immigrant workers, documented and undocumented alike, to pursue redress for the unlawful actions of
their employers).
25 Antonio Y. Vázquez-Arroyo, Agonized Liberalism, The Liberal Theory of William E. Connolly,
RADICAL PHILOSOPHY, Sep./Oct. 2004, at 8, 10.
26 Navarro, supra note 2, at 427.
27 Rachel F. Moran, Neither Black Nor White, Symposium, LatCrit Theory: Naming and Launching a New Discourse of Critical Legal Scholarship, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 61 (1997).
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II. NATIONALIST BORDERLANDS
Despite the problems present in Huntington’s defense of a white Anglo-Saxon Protestant patriotic identity, his argument echoes similar conceptual arguments used by Chicana nationalists like Gloria Anzaldúa. Although the political premises of Huntington and Anzaldúa’s narratives have
different goals, it is readily evident that both rely on a nationalist ideological framework to achieve the respective ends of their arguments. In fact,
both Huntington and Anzaldúa end up defending a nationalist narrative that
continues to reproduce a petty-bourgeoisie form of capitalism through the
reification of essentialist social constructions. Ironically, rather than engaging concrete material injustices, both Huntington and Anzaldúa resort to
founding racial myths and ideological psychobabble in order to substantiate
what turns out to be a project that reifies a capitalist status quo. In the interest of space, I limit my discussion to two fundamental points that illustrate my argument, namely, the use of racial, founding myths and the social
construction of a consciousness that avoids the present. I argue that a critical approach rooted in a leftist tradition should not lose sight of the influence of capitalism in shaping the contours of subordinated and exploited
identities.
Huntington’s anxieties with Mexicans and immigrants of Latin American heritage seem to be fueled by a sort of “underclass”, nationalist rhetoric
that describes most Latin American immigrants as “poor, unskilled, and not
28
well educated” and seeking to colonize spaces within the United States.
His main anxiety centers on the idea that Mexican immigrants, in particular,
will seek to create an autonomous region in the Southwest that will secede
from the United States, which will lead to a civil war between white nativists and immigrants. Ironically, Chicana writers like Gloria Anzaldúa, as
well as others, have not only defended the nationalist rhetoric underpinning
Huntington’s argument, but have embraced the nationalist borderlands debate as a central part of a subaltern narrative. Of course, it must be remembered that, while the political objectives may differ between Huntington and
Anzaldúa’s narratives, at a conceptual level both rely on a similar set of
myths and rhetorical claims.
Huntington’s anxieties can be discerned from his discussion of the socalled re-conquista, or the social, cultural, and demographic re-conquest of
the Southwest by Mexican migrants. This argument can be discerned from

28 Failing to recognize how United States foreign and domestic policies have shaped Cuban
immigration at a structural level, Huntington proceeds to suggest that Cuban immigration may not be as
bad as Mexican immigration due to the role of class in the supposed character of the immigrants.
HUNTINGTON, supra note 4, at 252-53.
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his insinuation that migrants can be compared to armed soldiers occupying
the United States, seeking to eventually re-claim for Mexico sovereignty
over a mythical nation located in the Southwest territories named Atzlán.
To be sure, Huntington writes:
[I]f each year a million Mexican soldiers attempted to invade the
United States and more than 150,000 of them succeeded, established
themselves on American territory, and the Mexican government then
demanded that the United States recognize the legality of this invasion, Americans would be outraged and would mobilize whatever resources were necessary to expel the invaders and to establish the integrity of their borders. Yet an illegal demographic invasion of comparable dimensions occurs each year, the president of Mexico argues that
it should be legalized, and at least before September 11, American political leaders more or less ignored it or implicitly accepted the elimi29
nation of the border as a long-term goal.
This sort of alarmist propaganda, unsubstantiated by any evidence, ultimately ends up legitimating white-supremacist and nativist arguments that
can only be addressed through extremist means. To use the analogy of a
soldier to represent an immigrant is, in some ways, legitimating the possible
future use of the U.S. military as a force to counter-Mexican migration.
Yet, Anzaldúa herself, while recognizing that North Americans conceptualize Mexican migrations as a “silent invasion,” also endeavors to
represent the migration of Mexicans to the Southwest territories as “the
30
return odyssey to the historical/mythological Aztlán.” While it is not readily evident that Anzaldúa would embrace a martial representation of the
immigrant, it is clear that migration should be conceptualized as the reconquest, from below, of an autonomous region, or rather a borderland between the United States and Mexico. This borderland space, Atzlán, would
conceivably exist as a liberated space where Chicanos could develop a new
consciousness that can withstand and challenge the hegemonic cultures of
either nation. Of course, unlike Huntington’s homogenizing culture, Anzaldúa’s culture would celebrate new ambiguities.
This concern with the physical conditions of the Southwest territories
is yet another example of the contradictory statements that inform Huntington’s overall patriotic narrative. To be sure, on the one hand, he asserts that
the WASP national identity, or creed, is not rooted in any attachment to a

29
30

Id. at 317-18.
ANZALDÚA, supra note 6, at 32-33.

FIU Law Review

44

[4:33

31

territory; yet he simultaneously validates the half-baked claims of advocates for a Chicano nationalist rhetoric when he writes:
[C]onceivably this could lead to a move to reunite these territories
with Mexico. That seems unlikely, but professor Charles Truxillo of
the University of New Mexico predicts that by 2080 the southwestern
states of the United States and the northern states of Mexico will come
together to form a new country, “La Republica del Norte.” The basis
for such a development exists in the surge of Mexicans northward and
the increasing economic ties between communities on different sides
32
of the border.
One has to wonder what is gained by publishing these “paranoid fanta33
Notwithstanding Huntington’s
sies” that “imagine dire conspiracies.”
propagandist rhetoric, it is readily evident that his narrative finds political
expression in the concern for the balkanization of the nation. The fear lies
in the possibility that Mexican migrants may actually be part of a great conspiracy, with an actual programmatic agenda, to occupy a particular territory in the U.S. that happens to be closer to Mexico.
My concern here, however, is not with Huntington’s shoddy defense of
patriotic ideologies, but rather with the ways in which this argument reproduces Latino/a borderlands narrative such as those articulated by Chicana
writers like Gloria Anzaldúa. It is ironic that Huntington’s argument echoes
the arguments of Chicana writers like Anzaldúa and other Chicano national34
ists. Of course, at the core of my argument, lies a blanket rejection of
nationalism as the best way to organize a political community in both the
present as well as in the future. I am convinced that it is possible to demonstrate how nationalist narratives reproduce undesirable forms of exploitation, subjugation, subordination, and oppression. This cultural narrative
inherently domesticates political dissent and creates the conditions that exempt the state or Federal government from using public funds to address the
structural inequalities that underpin the exploitation and subordination of
immigrants and Latino/as more generally. It is readily evident that both
Anzaldúa and Huntington accept capitalism as an ideological premise of
their mythic nations, but my point is to suggest that at a conceptual level
there is little difference between Huntington’s WASP patriotic national
identity and Anzaldúa’s Atzlán/borderlands myth.

31

HUNTINGTON, supra note 4, at 49-50.
Id. at 246.
33 Id. at 311.
34 See, e.g., ATZLAN, ESSAYS ON THE CHICANO HOMELAND (Rudolfo A. Anaya & Francisco
Lomeli eds., 1989).
32
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Huntington’s narrative seeks to rescue the founding principles of the
nation, which are under attack from a passive occupation being carried out
by Mexican and other Spanish-speaking immigrants who refuse to assimilate to the white culture. This founding identity, Huntington tells us, should
be represented in the following manner:
[T]he American people who achieved independence in the late eighteenth century were few and homogenous: overwhelmingly white
(thanks to the exclusion of blacks and Indians from citizenship), British, and Protestant, broadly sharing a common culture, and overwhelmingly committed to the principles embodied in the Declaration of In35
dependence, the Constitution, and other founding documents.
Huntington’s project seeks to reclaim a new type of patriotism that saves
the nation against the foreign invasion of Mexican nationals.
One way to discern the racial nature of this project is to engage his
discussion of the emergence of a new type of “white” nativism that presumably could be recast in a non-pejorative and neutral manner. Presumably,
Huntington suggests that it would not be wrong to “vigorously” “defend
one’s ‘native’ culture and identity and to maintain their purity against for36
eign influences.” Citing the work of Carol Swain, Huntington suggests
that the “new breed of white racial” advocates could conceptualize race as a
37
fixed and unchangeable source of culture. More importantly, Huntington
notes, that since:
[T]he shifting racial balance in the United States means a shifting cultural balance and the replacement of the white culture that made
America great by black or brown cultures that are different and, in
their view, intellectually and morally inferior. This mixing of races
and hence cultures is the road to national degeneration. For them, to
38
keep America America, it is necessary to keep America white.
Of course, Huntington’s allusions are couched in a renewed and distant
claim to being an objective observer of a new reality. Yet, this new reality
draws on the same racialist arguments that he defends in his patriotic quest
to resuscitate white, cultural hegemony. What is important to note is that
Huntington alludes to historical and alien notions of white, racial narratives
that have become discredited in the public realm because of their persistent
35 HUNTINGTON, supra note 4, at 11 (emphasis added). Again, note how Huntington neglects to
address the crux of the exclusion of blacks from the polity by a recasting of the effects of a slave holding
culture and identity through an allusion to the notion of citizenship.
36 Id. at 310.
37 Id. at 312.
38 Id.
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relationship to racist structures of oppression and exploitation. Presumably,
this “neutral” form of nativism could be recast as a new form of patriotism,
a patriotism that seeks to reaffirm the supremacy of the white culture in the
United States.
Anzaldúa’s borderlands narrative embraces a sort of historical millennialism that also traces the essentialist origins of the Aztec empire to the
southwestern territory known as Atzlán. According to this founding myth:
[T]he oldest evidence of humankind in the U.S.—the Chicanos’ ancient Indian ancestors—was found in Texas and has been dated to
35000 B.C. In the Southwest United States archeologists have found
20,000-year-old campsites of the Indians who migrated through, or
permanently occupied, the Southwest, Atzlán—land of the herons,
39
land of whiteness, the Edenic [sic] place of origin of the Azteca.
Like Huntington’s Anglo-Protestant founding myth, Anzaldúa suggests
that the core culture of Chicanos can be traced to the Aztec homeland, and,
more importantly, all Chicanos should rescue this core culture that has been
threatened by artificial physical, cultural, and psychological borders.
Anzaldúa’s representation of the founding racial myth describes the
“Aztecas del norte” as a single nation or indigenous tribe, which today
40
would be known as Chicanos. More importantly, Anzaldúa’s narrative
also calls for the re-conquest of the mythical homeland: “We have a tradition of migration, a tradition of long walks. Today we are witnessing la
Migración de los pueblos mexicanos, the return odyssey to the histori41
cal/mythological Atzlán. This time, traffic is from south to north.” Ironically, despite her recognition of the brutal nature of the Aztec empire, Anzaldúa is willing to use this historical representation of the indigenous sub42
ject as the starting point of the founding of Atzlán. Rather than taking the
contemporary ethos of the Indian, the Mexican, or the Chicana as a starting
point for a politics that responds to present needs and concrete forms of
43
oppression, Anzaldúa chooses an alien myth. This myth, like most myths,
neglects to engage the present on its own terms, and ultimately leaves us
with a story that depoliticizes the struggle of Chicanas and Latino/as more
generally. Stated differently, rather than framing a political position that
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ANZALDÚA, supra note 6, at 26.
Id. at 23.
41 Id. at 33.
42 Id. at 54.
43 For an important critique of Anzaldúa’s Indian, see generally Josefina Saldaña-Portillo, Who’s
the Indian in Aztlán? Re-Writing Mestizaje, Indianism, and Chicanismo from Lacandón, in THE LATIN
AMERICAN SUBALTERN STUDIES READER 402 (Ileana Rodríguez ed., 2001).
40
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engages oppressive and exploitative institutions, the reader is left with a
therapeutic option—acquire a new consciousness.
For Anzaldúa, “nothing happens in the ‘real’ world unless it first hap44
pens in the images in our heads.” Even economic exploitation is subordinated to the cultural and psychological realms in her narrative. Much like
Huntington argues, Anzaldúa writes:
Chicanos and other people of color suffer economically for not acculturating. This voluntary (yet forced) alienation makes for psychological conflict, a kind of dual identity—we don’t identify with the AngloAmerican cultural values and we don’t totally identify with the Mexican cultural values. We are a synergy of two cultures with various
45
degrees of Mexicanness or Angloness.
Again, rather than engaging a politics of concrete, material exploitation, the reader is left with ambiguities and fluid metaphors that will somehow empower the oppressed. I would like to see how this new consciousness would empower a migrant who is being treated like an animal by a
foreman in a sweatshop and/or a border patrol agent. Anzaldúa’s argument
becomes nothing more than a poetic inspiration that seeks to create a new
age consciousness in an ambiguous realm that is not just mythical, but also
disengaged from the concrete material experiences of the exploited and
oppressed. The institutional status quo is not challenged by this narrative.
Anzaldúa argues that her notion of race opposes the “theory of the
pure Aryan,” and “the policy of racial purity that white America practic46
es.” Drawing on an essentialist narrative of genomics, Anzaldúa offers the
possibility of a new mixed or mestiza race that provides the basis for a new
ideological, cultural, and biological cross-pollination that will, in turn, lead
to the creation of a new consciousness. Presumably, this mixture can be
read as the creation of a “cosmic race” that will heal the fragmented psyche
of borderland inhabitants and will encourage a liberal vision of tolerance.
Yet, this new cosmic race is rooted in a borderland, an exceptional and
mythical place that is in between nations.
The problem with this narrative is that it continues to hinge on an essentialist notion of a race, albeit a cosmic one that is located in an ambiguous national space, the borderland space between the U.S. and Mexico.
The ambiguity, the fluidity, and the mobility of this identity become fixed in
this borderland abstraction. The question remains, who can be accepted as
a good citizen in this fluid, albeit national place? Can an individual who
44
45
46

ANZALDÚA, supra note 6, at 109.
Id. at 85.
Id. at 99.
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does not have the cosmic, genetic heritage find a democratic sense of equality in this national space? Is the individual forced to assimilate in order to
lead a meaningful life there? Will market-oriented and capitalist structures
be challenged in this space? Anzaldúa’s text suggests that at the end of the
day her argument is yet another effort to reform a Western liberal system by
creating a more tolerant national space. This borderland space is merely a
celebratory space within a hegemonic liberal culture, the status quo.
III. A LATCRIT PERSPECTIVE?
Over the years, LatCrit has been encouraging a conversation across
disciplines. Unfortunately, the work of academics and poets like Huntington and Anzaldúa provide normative arguments that contribute to various
legal and public policy debates. At this particular time when immigration
reform is on the legislative agenda and when right-wing rhetoric has been
shaping the contours of the limits for legal reform, it is imperative that
scholars engage these debates. A LatCrit approach could use as a starting
point the relationship between these debates and the law, race, and nationalism.
Neither Huntington nor Anzaldúa’s arguments offer much in the form
of a conceptual critique of law. Huntington’s argument is reminiscent of a
right-wing, original intent approach to the interpretation of law. Huntington’s argument would encourage us to look at the “original” principles and
interpretations embraced by the founding “fathers” as a guide to interpreting the constitution. His argument would ignore the important and radical
transformations of both the constitutional text and the interpretation of the
law that have resulted from long and protracted struggles. Huntington’s
argument neglects to consider how these socio-legal changes have been part
of a mutually constitutive story of nation-state building that has abandoned
the founding principles of his white Anglo-Saxon protestant patriotic identity. Simply put, the history of changes in law and society are descriptive of
a new and constantly changing United States-American identity.
In contrast, Anzaldúa’s argument seems to suggest a focus on the penumbras of the law. Anzaldúa’s argument suggests that there is a need to
break with the fixed dualities present in law in order to open up a more fluid space to re-think the law. Law can become something else that is more
malleable and open to multiple sources beyond black letter law and the positivist influences of a formalist approach. This conception, however,
leaves us with a quandary, namely, to what extent will this fluidity lend
itself to take measure position on questions of justice. Stated differently, to
what extent can the law be used to prohibit injustices? Yet, Anzaldúa also
suggests that law, here understood as a concrete institution, may become
irrelevant when the new mestiza consciousness takes hold of the borderland
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subject. Perhaps Anzaldúa’s critique may lead to an anarchic conception of
society where law no longer matters. The ambiguities in Anzaldúa’s narrative leave open either of these possibilities.
The LatCrit approach argues that race is a social construction and that
47
essentialist categories contribute to the subordination of subjects. To this
end, any form of essentialism, strategic or otherwise, goes counter to a LatCrit approach. I also believe that it is possible to take a stance against racism without having to have a reified narrative of race. It is possible to denounce forms of oppression without having to accept an essentialist narrative of race. Huntington’s narrative assumes the hegemonic supremacy of a
founding racial-culture at the expense of other socially-constructive narratives of race. More importantly, it is premised on the idea that non-WASPs
have to assume a WASP cultural ethos in order to become good citizens and
in order to preserve the stability of the nation-state. Ironically, Huntington’s narrative exempts from responsibility the WASP narrative, which has
both created the oppressive and exploitative conditions that have led to
challenges by non-whites and been responsible for the institutionalization
of racist social constructions. To the extent that Huntington’s ideology provides a normative basis or explanation for the new immigration reforms, it
should be challenged by a LatCrit approach.
In contrast, Anzaldúa’s narrative merits particular attention because,
while it pretends to open up a debate on race by creating a fluid or hybrid
racialized space, it continues to reify genetic, biological, cultural, and ideological notions of race. The assumption, of course, is that it is possible in
the first place to talk about essential races comprising a so-called cosmic
race in a borderland space, a space reminiscent of traditional forms of
American exceptionalism. A LatCrit approach to this founding argument
would question the essential character of any founding racial narrative, regardless of the efforts to re-cast race in a more fluid manner.
The question of nationalism remains subject to debate in the LatCrit
approach. Progressive forms of nationalism, here understood as antiimperialist locations that provide a space for critical and autonomous self48
determination, are popular among some LatCrit scholarship. Likewise,
critical approaches that are premised on global and post-colonial views and
47 See, e.g., Francisco Valdes, Latina/o Ethnicities, Critical Race Theory, and Post-Identity Politics in Postmodern Legal Culture: From Practices to Possibilities, 9 LA RAZA L.J. 1, 24-30 (1996)
(offering three possibilities to challenges of liberal approach to identity politics).
48 See generally PEDRO A. MALAVET, AMERICA'S COLONY: THE POLITICAL AND CULTURAL
CONFLICT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND PUERTO RICO 13, 100-16 (2004) (offering “a pluralistic
communitarian proposal to reform the construction of citizenship in traditional liberalism in general and
American constitutional liberal theory in particular.”); Angel R. Oquendo, National Culture in PostNational Societies, 50 VILL. L. REV. 963, 965-66 (2005).
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premised on a human rights discourse are also present in LatCrit approach49
es. I am not sure that it is possible to reconcile these positions, but LatCrit
50
provides a space for this tension. What is clear, however, is that a LatCrit
approach would question nationalist forms of exclusion and subordination.
Huntington’s narrative is by definition antithetical to any LatCrit approach.
Anzaldúa’s nationalism, without the essentialist racial premises, could be
appropriated to create a performative space where other fixed identities
could be challenged.
IV. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Historically, leftist debates have been rooted in a Marxist critique of
capitalism. One of the perils of the Marxist position, however, has been
that it has traditionally reduced all questions of identity to a class analysis.
Instead of simply becoming social constructions, race, identity, and nationalism become class-based constructions to alienate workers from one
another. Of course, social narratives are also primarily shaped by capitalist
structures. It follows from a Marxist perspective that once the class based
or material dimensions of society are addressed, the dimensions that alienate subjects and workers in different ways, including problems of racism
and nationalism, should fade away. More importantly, there is a traditional
assumption that workers will rationally privilege their material well-being
over other ideological forms of subordination when seeking to address conflict. Unfortunately, it is possible to argue that individuals or groups have
also been willing to adopt racist and xenophobic stances against fellow
workers, even when these stances may actually contribute to their own subordination and exploitation. The LatCrit approach creates a space where
the multiple dimensions of those cleavages can be explored without being
51
subordinated to a rigid class-based paradigm.
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to rehash the counter52
critiques of the LatCrit approach, I do want to suggest that the focus on
anti-essentialism and the multiple dimensions of subordination leave a door
49 See generally Berta Esperanza Hernández-Truyol, Globalized Citizenship: Sovereignty, Security and Soul, 50 VILL. L. REV. 1009 (2005).
50 For an alternative perspective, see generally Maria Clara Dias, Moral Dimensions of Nationalism, 50 VILL. L. REV. 1063 (2005) (discussing nationalists’ adoption of human rights policies that follow
human rights norms).
51 See generally The Proceedings of the Tenth Annual LatCrit Conference, Critical Approaches to
Economic In/justice, Caribe Hilton Hotel, San Juan, Puerto Rico, Oct. 6-10, 2005,
http://biblioteca.rrp.upr.edu/LatCritCD/annualconferences/acx/finalprogramlatcritx.pdf.
52 For a summary of some of these debates, see generally Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, "Kulturkampf[s]" or “fits of spite"?: Taking the Academic Culture Wars Seriously, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 1309
(2005).
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open to a critique of racism and xenophobia that can draw on a traditional
Marxist left. This approach, however, demands that categories of oppression should not be reduced to mere class relations. Rather, what is at stake
is a concern with multiple relations of power and an understanding of context in multiple ways. Huntington’s racist and xenophobic narrative provides us with yet another example of the ways in which right-wing positions continue to legitimate ideologies of human subordination in the name
of white Anglo-Saxon protestant patriotism in a capitalist system. Anzaldúa’s argument neglects to challenge the role of capitalism in shaping the
contours of racial, albeit hybrid, national space. Both narratives draw on
essentialist constructions of race and the reification of a nationalist narrative
in ways that continue to perpetuate a liberal ethos, an ethos that has found a
constant companion in capitalist forms of subordination and exploitation.
The LatCrit approach can offer potential insights into the ways that both
Huntington’s and Anzaldúa’s narratives reproduce capitalist constructions
of race and nation, and how these can become normative guides for the
development of legal ideologies.

